INTRODUCTION
THE PRINCIPAL JUSTIKICATION for intellectual property (IP) laws in the AngloAmerican tradition is economic.' Without a grant of exclusive rights, innovators would have too little incentive to invest in socially beneficial innovations for this simple reason: developing the first embodiment of an innovation generally requires a very substantial investment; subsequent copies are generally far less costly to make, and are often trivially cheap and easy.
2 If creators cannot prevent others from selling products embodying their innovations-which copyists can offer at a lower price if able to free-ride on the innovator's first copy costs-innovators will not be able to recoup their research and development (R&D) costs and justify further investments in innovations. 3 Although the non-excludable, nonrival character of intellectual creations resembles public goods, 4 it is socially desirable for private actors, rather than the government, to make the investments to overcome this public goods problem. 5 Intellectual property rights are an ingenious device for addressing this problem: the government grants rights to qualifying innovators, and the rights provide incentives to individuals to invest in innovation because the rights granted provide assurance that innovators can recoup their R&D costs if their intellectual creations prove to be valued by the 5 of employment). 7 The economics of copyright collectives and of compulsory licensing has also garnered scholarly attention. 18 Cultural economics, a subfield of economics, has studied the market for art and cultural products, such as opera and theatre, and offered insights about policies needed to induce investment in these cultural forms. 19 One bold work considers whether economics is friend or foe of copyright, 20 but rare is the work that attempts to analyze the economics of copyright as a whole. Among the most studied subjects has been the economics of the fair use doctrine of US copyright law. 21 Economists and economically minded legal scholars often view uses of copyrighted works as fair if high transaction costs or other factors have impeded the effective establishment of a market for clearing rights. 22 Particularly influential has been Wendy Gordon's analysis of the fair use issues in the Sony Betamax case. Gordon argued that use of Betamax machines to tape broadcast television programs for later viewing should be fair because the costs of negotiating rights clearances would greatly exceed fees collectable for this kind of socially beneficial use. 2 3 Economics is especially useful in providing guidance on this copyright issue because the economic effects of a challenged use are almost always of central importance in judging whether the use will be deemed non-infringing as a fair use.
4
Economists and economically minded legal scholars have questioned or criticized certain copyright rules as economically unsound. For example, it is unnecessary for personal letters and diaries to automatically qualify for copyright protection, given that these works would be created without the economic incentives of copyright. 25 Special exemptions from copyright liability for certain events organized by agricultural cooperatives and veterans' groups seem to be the product of special interest lobbying, rather than rigorous economic analysis.
26
Extension of the duration of copyrights in existing works 2 7 and so-called "restoration" of foreign copyrights that had long been in the public domain for failure to comply with US formalities 2 (for instance, putting copyright notices on published copies of the work) are also economically questionable.
29
As interesting and provocative as the literature on the economics of copyright is, even its most ardent fans would have to admit that economics has rarely played a significant role in the copyright law and policymaking process. Section 2 will consider various reasons why economics has not been more influential in copyright up until now. Section 3 will discuss the economics of extending the terms of existing copyrights and the Supreme Court's decision in the Eldred v. Ashcroft case.30 Although an initial reading of the Supreme Court's decision might suggest a dim future influence of economics on copyright law, Section 3 explains why this interpretation of the Eldred decision is incorrect. Section 4 will discuss particular venues in which economics would be most useful in advancing the copyright law and policymaking process. Legislators should (and occasionally do) seek independent economic expertise when considering copyright and related intellectual property proposals. Courts may find economic analysis a useful input to sound decision-making, especially in cases involving new technology issues unanticipated when legislatures adopted copyright laws. Section 5 will consider some reasons why copyright professionals might resist the incursion of economics into the copyright policy process, and why economics should nonetheless play a more important role in copyright policymaking in the future.
WHY HAS ECONOMICS HAD SO LITTLE IMPACT
ON COPYRIGHT SO FAR?
ONE SALIENT FACTOR EXPLAINING why economic analysis has had so little impact on copyright law and policy is a lack of economic expertise in the relevant policy making community. Many copyright professionals have backgrounds in fields other than economics and are more inclined to embrace a romantic conception about art and literature and the people and firms who create and commercialize copyrighted works. This tendency disinclines them to look to economics for guid- For path-dependent historical reasons, copyright and other intellectual property policy matters in the US have generally been considered by subcommittees of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, rather than by Commerce Committees, from which economic regulations often emerge. These subcommittees have relied heavily on industry witnesses when considering copyright and other intellectual property-related legislation. Copyright industry groups, in fact, often write the laws that the legislature enacts.
33
A revolving door enables copyright experts to move from the legislature or legislative committee staff positions to law firms representing major copyright firms to industry associations to government agencies responsible for framing copyright law and policy.3 4 This contributes to insularity in copyright policy analysis.
The US is not alone in its systematic, if perhaps unconscious, exclusion of or inattention to economic analysis in the copyright policy-making process. Nations whose legal rules are grounded in the natural right of authors in their works, 3 5 especially those that affirm that authors have moral rights in their works, have less reason to perceive economics as a useful input in the policymaking process than the U.S., which at least historically conceptualized copyright in utilitarian terms.
Although the tight nexus between the copyright industry and the policymaking community is the main reason economics has thus far had so little influence on copyright law and policy, it is not the only factor at work. An impediment to influence is that economists who study copyright issues often speak in a language inaccessible to policymakers and copyright professionals. Few copyright 455 (discussing the romantic conception of copyright). See also Breyer, "Uneasy Case", supra note 7 at 284-91 (discussing non-economic justifications for copyright If economists wish for their work to inform the copyright policy process, they will have to learn to translate their insights into a more vernacular form. They may also need to publish policyrelevant work in venues where policymakers would be likely to read it. Cultural differences are also a factor. Lawyers and pohicymakers view some problems that deeply engage economists (e.g., the optimal duration of a patent or of copyright protection for computer software 6 ) as a waste of time. Other issues of interest to economists (e.g., network externalities) may have policy implications that are not readily apparent to copyright professionals," A legal and policy audience may find incomplete an economic analysis whose policy implications are not spelled out. If economists want their work to inform the copyright policymaking process, they will have to invest the extra time necessary to articulate the policy implications that flow from their analyses.
The standard economic practice of articulating simplifying assumptions before constructing an economic analysis does not mesh well with the mindset of lawyers and policymakers either. If the whole edifice of an analysis depends on assumptions A, B, C, D and E being true and at least one of them is questionable, lawyers and other policy analysts may be inclined to discredit the analysis as a house of cards.
Influencing copyright law and policy will also require economists to give this field somewhat greater attention. Economic research on intellectual property issues has tended to focus on subjects for which funding from government or foundation grants is available. Until quite recently, grant-makers rarely supported research on copyright issues. Far more economic research has been done on patent issues, mainly because of their significance for the predominant industrial economy of the 19th and 20th centuries, but also because more funding has historically been available to study the economics of patents. The emergence of an information-based economy in the late 20th century has attracted the attention of economists and economically-informed lawyers to exploring the economics of copyright. 38 Also an impediment to influence, is the plain fact that economics will not always yield an unimpeachable policy prescription for copyright issues. This is partly due to the complex intricacies of the many industries that rely upon or intersect with copyright law. Since copyright law has many provisions of general applicability that affect a wide range of industries-from book publishing to 
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architecture to computer software to theatrical performances, just to name a few-it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to assess with any precision the economic effects likely to flow from adoption of particular copyright rules, let alone the economics of the copyright regime as a whole 3 9 It is to be expected, moreover, that on many issues, economists will differ in their analyses of the same issue. In A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., for example, economic experts offered widely varying analyses of the effects of peer to peer file sharing on the market for digital music.
40 Some economists considered file sharing to be benign or beneficial, while others asserted it was harmful to the market for sound recordings. 4 1 Policymakers will understandably be reluctant to put much weight on economic expertise if equally qualified experts offer irreconcilably conflicting analyses of the same phenomenon. Another barrier to influence is the understandable reluctance of copyright lawyers and policy professionals to acknowledge the public choice problems presented by the current copyright law and policy-making process. 42 These problems are well-documented in the scholarly literature. 43 Major copyright firms are well-organized and well-funded. They typically have a common interest in getting stronger legal rules from the legislature. Hence, it may be a sound investment for them to lobby to achieve the concentrated benefit a legislature can grant them. The public may ultimately have to pay higher costs if copyright lobbyists are successful, but these costs are diffused and distributed over a broad base of people and firms. Collective action problems make it difficult for parties that will be negatively affected by higher protection rules to organize effective resistance to copyright industry lobbying. This mix of concentrated benefits and distributed costs is likely to yield the best laws money can buy. The Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), 44 Constitution by extending the term of existing copyrights for an additional twenty years because the public got nothing in return for that grant. The CTEA was purely a windfall to existing copyright owners. Such a quid pro nihilo, Eldred argued, failed to satisfy constitutional standards.
50
Seventeen economists-including five Nobel Prize winners-signed a friend-of-the-court brief to the US Supreme Court in support of Eldred's challenge to the CTEA.
1 The brief made the obvious point that the CTEA could not incent the creation of works already in existence, 5 2 It went on to consider the deadweight loss that a longer term of above-cost pricing would bring, as well as the substantial transactions costs the CTEA imposes on subsequent users.
3
Tracking down copyright owners and negotiating with them is costly, even if the owners do not insist on payments for reproducing or distributing copies of their 45. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998 works. CTEA impedes public access to many works that are no longer commercially exploited, but that may still be of interest, as well as preventing the creation of many new derivative works . 4 The economists' brief also pointed out that life of the author plus seventy years was virtually equivalent to the perpetual term of copyright that the Constitution forbids 55
The Supreme Court rejected Eldred's challenge to the CTEA. Congress had a rational basis, the Court decided, for believing that CTEA would lead to more investments in distributing and preserving existing works. 5 The Constitution gave to Congress the responsibility of crafting copyright legislation, and even if it exercised this power unwisely, the Court was reluctant to secondguess legislative decisions 5 7 Only Justice Breyer would have struck down the CTEA on an economic interpretation of the Constitution. 56 The Eldred opinion is starkly different from many of the Court's rulings on economic regulations. Economic analysis is generally quite influential when the Supreme Court assesses economic regulations, especially among the more conservative members of the Court. 5 9 Given how often the Court has emphasized the economic incentive rationale for the existence of copyright law, 6 it is striking how little attention was paid to economics in Eldred. Justice Ginsburg, who authored the majority opinion, is not, of course, the most economically minded of the Justices. But the de-emphasis on economics in Eldred has other roots. There is a deep rift within the Court about constitutional powers of Congress and about how much deference to give to legislation emanating from Congress. 6 ' Eldred's lawyers drew upon several Supreme Court precedents interpreting the constitutional powers of Congress in a restrictive manner and establishing rigorous standards for judging the constitutionality of certain kinds of legislation. 6 -Further limitations on Congress' power under Article 1, § 8, cl. 8 were, Eldred's lawyers argued, consistent with these recent precedents, 63 lawyers hoped the analogy to these other restrictive rulings would woo the more conservative members of the Court to further restrictions on Congress' constitutional powers in Eldred. Eldred's lawyers used a different strategy to persuade Justices Breyer and Stevens (who had dissented in the earlier challenges to Congress' power) to support Eldred's cause."' There was, in short, a lot going on in the Eldred case that had nothing whatsoever to do with copyright law but a good deal to do with the Court's internal debate on the scope of Congress' powers under the Constitution. Other factors were also at play. Most significant was the indisputable fact that Congress had extended the term of existing copyrights numerous times before: in 1790, 1831, 1909, and 1976 , as well as several other times leading up to enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976.66 Although Eldred's lawyers developed an elaborate chart to distinguish the CTEA from other extensions, 7 this chart may have backfired because it underscored the frequency of these enactments. "To comprehend the scope of Congress' power [to extend terms of existing copyrights] under the Copyright Clause," said the Court, "'a page of history is worth a volume of logic."'t
The Court was also understandably concerned about the implications of a ruling in Eldred's favour. If the CTEA was invalid, the retroactive term extensions in the Copyright Act of 1976 would almost certainly be challenged, and it was not immediately evident how the Court could find a principled basis for distinguishing this extension from the CTEA. 6 9 Had the Court acceded to the heightened scrutiny for which Eldred argued, 7 " it might have opened the floodgates of constitutional challenges to intellectual property legislation, not just to copyright rules. 71 Finally, Eldred was willing to accept that life of the author plus seventy years was a "limited time" under the Constitution applied prospectively. 72 In view of this, the Court thought that life plus seventy years must also be sufficiently limited applied retroactively Taking into account the range of explanatory factors, the Eldred decision may be less of a setback for a significant role for economic analysis in copyright 65 . In view of Justice Breyer's earlier economic skepticism about copyright, see Breyer, supra note 7, Eldred's lawyers expected him to be skeptical of the CTEA on economic grounds and receptive to arguments based on the constitutional history of the Intellectual Property Clause indicating that the Framers embedded limits in it in order to guard against rent-seeking. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 48, at 23-26, Eldred's lawyers thought Justice Stevens would be receptive to their arguments because his opinion in Sony Corp, of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., supra note 60. Therein he emphasized copyright as a limited monopoly, the primary purpose of which was to promote public access to knowledge. ("The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired,") 66. law and policy than a cursory glance might suggest. The Court was not willing to interpret the Constitution as mandating economically sound results, but this does not mean that the Court believes that copyright law and policy should be uninformed by economic analysis. The next section will consider several contexts in which economic analysis has been, and is likely to be, a useful input into the policymaking process for copyright and related forms of intellectual property law.
WHEN MIGHT ECONOMICS BE USEFUL?
WHEN LEGISLATURES CONSIDER PROPOSALS to add a new subject matter to copyright, or to adopt new copyright-like forms of legal protection, they should (and occasionally do), seek input from impartial economic experts about whether such legislation is necessary to address a market failure that is deterring socially optimal investments in particular classes of innovations or information resources. Economic expertise, for example, had some influence in the US when the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), made economic as well as doctrinal arguments urging that copyright law be used to protect computer programs 7 3 The European Union, too, relied on economic analysis in crafting appropriate copyright rules for computer programs. 4 Owing in substantial part to the decisions of the US and the EU to protect programs by copyright, this rule became an international standard in 1994, after member states of the World Trade Organization (WTO) acceded to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which required copyright protection for programs.
7t
The US Congress has a more mixed record in relying on economic analysis when considering sui generis (of its own kind), forms of legal protection for other innovations. It relied heavily on economic arguments when adopting in 1984, a new law to protect original layouts of circuits in semiconductor chips. 76 However, it adopted a copyright-like form of legal protection for vessel hulls and other boat parts in 1998, without serious economic evidence or expertise to support it. 77 Yet, economic analysis has had some cautionary influence on Congress in the debate about whether to adopt an equivalent sui _eneris right in the data in databases such as the EU adopted in 1996.78
The European Commission asserted a market failure rationale to justify the issuance of a Directive to member states of the EU requiring them to adopt a sui generis form of intellectual property protection for controlling extraction and reuse of data in databases. 7 9 Without such a law, the theory went, there would be too few incentives to invest in database development. 0 The new law confers, on those who invest substantial resources in database development, fifteen years of exclusive rights to control extraction and reuse of all or substantial parts of the databases (renewable for additional fifteen year terms so long as substantial investments continue). 1 Although the Commission invoked an economic rationale for this law, it neglected to provide any empirical evidence of market failure or rigorous economic analysis of the regime proposed to cure the perceived failure. Had the Commission been more rigorous in its use of economics, the European Parliament might have realized there was less of a need for this sui generis law than the Commission posited and might have adopted a somewhat narrower form of legal protection for data in databases.
2
Economic input should also be sought when copyright laws are amended. Had the US Congress, for example, sought impartial advice from economists about the effects of copyright term extension before enacting the CTEA, it is conceivable that economic arguments against it would have persuaded some 
81.
Ibid. arts. 7, 10.
82. See e.g. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 79 at 113-36 (criticizing the EU sui generis regime because of its potential harmful effects on competition and innovation as well as for science).
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in Congress to oppose it. 3 Economic analysis might also have been useful in assessing the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, which have been heavily criticized as overbroad and anti-competitive.
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Copyright rules are also sometimes promulgated in the context of agency rule-making. Economic analysis should be a useful input to decisionmaking in this venue as well. For example, the Copyright Office is required to make determinations about claims for allocation of compulsory license revenues to particular copyright owners. 85 Economic analysis would be helpful in making such assessments. Proposals for new compulsory licenses or revisions to existing compulsory licenses should, likewise, be scrutinized for economic soundness.Y 6 The US Copyright Office has been given power to conduct rule-makings every three years to consider whether to exempt certain classes of works or uses of works from anti-circumvention rules. 87 This should be a forum in which the Office might be educated about the economic effects of broad anti-circumvention rules.
Once rules have been legislated or issued by an appropriate agency, economics may sometimes have a useful role to play, and sometimes not, in how the law is interpreted thereafter. If a legislature has adopted an open-ended rule (eg., that copyright protects an author's expression, not her ideas or methods), economic analysis may be a useful tool in interpreting the law in an economically sound way. However, if the legislature has precisely crafted certain rules that prove to be economically harmful, it may be more appropriate to invoke economic analysis to support proposed amendments to the law than in interpreting the rules in litigation.
An instructive example of the pros and cons of economic analysis in the interpretation of open-ended copyright rules can be found in the US judicial experience interpreting copyright law as applied to computer programs 8 Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Labs., Inc. was the first American appellate decision to consider whether the "structure, sequence, and organization" ("SSO") of computer programs could be protected by copyright law. 89 Whelan relied upon both doctrinal and economic grounds in ruling that SSO was copyright-protectable, The doctrinal analysis relied on this syllogism: computer programs are considered to be literary works under US copyright law, and since the structure, sequence, and organization of literary works are, generally, protected by copyright law, the structure, sequence, and organization of programs should be protected by copyright law as weil 90 83 . See e.g. Brief of Akerlof, supra note 51; Karjaia, supra note 29. Complementing this doctrinal analysis was an economic argument that focused on the need for software developers to have sufficient protection to recoup development costs and on the locus of value in computer programs:
By far the larger portion of the expense and difficulty in creating computer programs is attributable to the development of the structure and logic of the program, and to debugging, documentation and maintenance, rather than to the coding. See Frank, Critical Issues in Software 22 (1983) (only 20% of the cost of program development goes into coding); Zelkowitz, Perspective on Software Engineering , 10 Computing Surveys 197-216 (June, 1978) . See also infoWorld, Nov. 11, 1985 at 13 ("the 'look and feel' of a computer software product often involves much more creativity and often is of greater commercial value than the program code which implements the product..."). The evidence in this case is that Ms. Whelan spent a tremendous amount of time studying Jaslow Labs, organizing the modules and subroutines for the Dentalab program, and working out the data arrangements, and a comparatively small amount of time actually coding the Dentalab program.
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The Third Circuit took seriously a friend-of-the-court brief submitted by a software industry organization. The brief argued that if copyright protection did not extend to the SSO of a program, the software industry would be jeopardized because the Jaw would provide too little protection to induce an optimal level of investment in development of computer programs.1 2 The Third Circuit directly responded to this plea: "The rule proposed here, which allows copyright protection beyond the literal computer code, would provide the proper incentive for programmers by protecting their most valuable efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the development of new computer devices that accomplish the same end."
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Between 1986 and 1992, the Whelan decision was influential in subsequent US cases, both in its doctrinal and economic reasoning.
9 4 The first decision that challenged Whelan's hegemony was Computer Associates v. Altai, Inc. in 1992. 9 1 On one important point, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Whelan: the structure, sequence and organization of a program could, in an appropriate case, be protected by copyright law 9 6 Unlike Whelan, which regarded program structure as exempt from infringement only when there was essentially no other way to structure the program, 97 the court in Altai reasoned that similarities in the structure of two programs might, however, be due to functional constraints such as the need to develop a program that would interoperate with another program, efficiency considerations, or use of the same standard programming techniques, none of which was protected by copyright law. While incentive based arguments in favor of broad copyright protection are perhaps attractive from a pure policy perspective .... ultimately, they have a corrosive effect on certain fundamental tenets of copyright doctrine. If the test we have outlined results in narrowing the scope of protection, as we expect it will, that result flows from applying, in accordance with Congressional intent, long-standing principles of copyright law to computer programs.
The Second Circuit pointed out that patent protection might be a more suitable way to protecting some program innovations than copyright.
0 " If copyright proved to be too "thin" to provide proper incentives to program developers, this was a matter for Congress, not the courts, to consider.
Altai holds that copyright protection is unavailable to elements of programs necessary for interoperation with other programs (that is, program interfaces). 107 Judged purely in terms of the creativity and judgment required to design them, program interfaces might initially seem to be "original" enough to be protectable expression as a matter of copyright law.""' However, once developed, program interfaces unquestionably constrain the design choices of subsequent programmers seeking to develop software capable of successfully interacting with an existing program.
The competition policy significance of copyright protection for interfaces was recognized in Europe in part because the Competition Policy Directorate of the European Commission had taken action against IBM arising from its practice of changing interfaces in a manner that had exclusionary impacts on European developers of computer peripheras, 1 0 If European software developers were going to be able to compete with US software in the world market, these developers would need to be able to use interface information from American programs. The EC Competition Policy Directorate intervened in negotiations surrounding the drafting of a directive on the legal protection for computer software that resulted in these economic considerations being brought to bear on the scope of copyright protection for software in Europe.
111
The US and EU consensus on limiting copyright to enable interoperability influenced other nations as well. 112 by new technologies for the application of copyright law to digital works continue to be troublesome. Perhaps the most potent example has been the entertainment industry lawsuits against the developers of peer to peer file sharing technologies. 123 While economic analysis has been of some assistance to judges forced to grapple with the thorny legal issues these cases present, 12 4 it may be necessary for legislatures to address what standards ought to apply in regulating technologies with infringing and non-infringing uses.
5
It is worth noting that the Canadian Supreme Court recently considered another new technology issue that was certainly not anticipated when the Canadian legislature enacted its copyright law. The Court concluded that the economic rights of an artist were not infringed when a purchaser of copies of his work transferred the copyrighted image from paper to canvas and then resold the copies.
1 26 Although not invoking economic analysis as such, the care with which the Canadian Court considered the economic impacts of the challenged use was impressive and bodes well for further uses of economic arguments in copyright cases in Canada.
CONCLUSION
COPYRIGHT IS AN IMPORTANT FORM of economic regulation. This essay has considered several reasons why economic analysis has had relatively little effect on copyright law and policy thus far. It has also argued that economics has much to offer in assisting policymakers and judges in crafting sound copyright law and policy.
There are several reasons why courts and policymakers may resist the incursion of economics into the copyright law and policymaking process and in the interpretation of copyright law. As noted in Section 2, many in the copyright field, including policymakers, have little or no economic expertise and little inclination to seek it out. Second, copyright industry professionals have been successful in getting much if not all of what they want without the aid of economics, so they may perceive little need for this analytical tool. Third, copyright industry professionals may be wary of embracing economics because although it may sometimes provide support for stronger protection rules, it may not always cut in their favor. They may resist embracing a tool that might provide grounds for 123 . See e.g. Napster, supra note 40 (preliminary injunction against peer to peer software developer as a contributory and vicarious infringer of digital music copyrights because of centra(ized directory and indexing functionality); policy outcomes they disfavor. Fourth, until some major participant in the copyright policy-making process decides that economic analysis would be valuable as input to the policy process, the inertia of the current situation is likely to persist. Even so, I predict that economic analysis will have greater impact on copyright in the future. A new generation of scholars is building up a rich corpus of policy-relevant copyright research and is articulating the policy-relevant implications of this research. 1 27 There is now a Society for Economic Research on Copyright Issues (SERCI), which hosts an annual international conference and publishes edited volumes of research on the economics of copyright. 1 28 The increasing importance of copyright industries to the US and world economy should make policymakers more receptive to insights that economics can provide. 129 Moreover, the inclusion of copyright and other intellectual property rights within the framework for promoting world trade by virtue of adoption of the TRIPS Agreement as part of the agreements establishing the World Trade Organization should lead to greater use of economic learning to shape global intellectual property norms.Ia This should lead to greater reliance on economic expertise at the national legislative and policymaking process.
Perhaps it is only a matter of time before the U.S Copyright Office and sister agencies in other countries will hire not just a resident economist, but a group of them, one of which might be designated a Chief Economist, and give serious consideration to economic effects before endorsing particular legislative initiatives. Economic principles can contribute to evolving our understanding of the access/incentives tradeoff so that copyright will continue-or perhaps return to--its long-standing tradition of promoting the progress of science and the useful arts to the benefit of humankind.
